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LEGISLATION
CIVIL RIGHTS LAw-FEDERAL COMMISSION

ON CivIL RIGHTS Is

ESTAn-

purpose of the passage by Congress of the "Civil Rights Act" on September 9,
19571 was to provide a means of further securing and protecting the civil
rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. Part 12 of
the Act provides for the establishment of the "Commission on Civil Rights"
within the executive branch of the Government. This Commission is to be
composed of six members who shall be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The duties of the Commission as set
forth in the Act are as follows: (1) to investigate allegations that certain
citizens of the United States are being deprived of their right to vote and
have the vote counted by reason of their 'color, race, religion or national
origin; (2) study and collect information concerning legal developments
constituting a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution;
and (3) to determine the value and effectiveness of the laws and policies of
the Federal Government with respect to equal protection of the laws under
the Constitution.
As a means of further securing and protecting the right to vote, the
Act added the following subsection to the present text of Section 2004 of
the Revised Statutes (42 U. S. C. 1971, IV) "No person, whether acting
under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, coerce or attempt
to intimidate, any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right
of such other person tW vote, or to vote as he may choose, or of causing
such other person to vote for, or not to vote for, any candidate for the office
of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the Senate, or
Member of the House of Representatives, Delegates or Commissioners from
the Territories or Possessions, at any general, special, or primary election
held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing any such
3
candidate."
The main objective of this Act is to further protect those rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
Those rights have been denied to certain segments of our population because
of race, color or religion. This discriminatory action by private individuals
and state governments has largely been directed against the Negro in the
areas of education, elections, jury service, housing and public transportation.
In this Act particular emphasis is given to protecting the right to vote as
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment and the right to equal protection
under the laws of the United States as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Today there are many Negroes in the Southern United States who
wish to vote but are not free to vote. The unconstitutional and discrimininatory administration of election laws and the use of threats, mob action,
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3 Pub. L. 85-315, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 9, 1957).

2 71 Stat. 934, 42 U. S. C. A. 1975 a,b,c,d,e (1957).
3 71 Stat. 131, 42 U. S. C. A. 1971 (1957).
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and fear continue to disenfranchise the Negro, but more have voted than
ever before.
With the 1954 and 1955 School Segregation Cases in the limelight and
particularly that of Brown v. The Board of Education of Topeka,4 by which
segregation in public school systems was declared illegal, there has been a
natural tendency among the public to be less interested in other aspects of
discrimination to which the above Act has been directed. As the inferior
courts in the communities of the South approach the problem of integration in public school education, through trial and error, the ever present
problems of discrimination in elections, of discrimination in the selection of
all white juries, of segregation in transportation, housing and public recreational facilities still remain with us. There have been several Supreme Court
decisions, many opinions in the lower tribunals, and scores of administrative
actions attesting to the fact that these problems are still with us although
progress has been made in eliminating these conditions.
Recently three Federal Courts have decided questions on discrimination in elections. In McDonald v. Key, 5 the court decided that it was
illegal to place the word "Negro" in parenthesis after a candidate's name
in a primary ballot. In Williams v. McCulley, 6 the court held that where
exhibits consisting of application cards of prospective voters showed all were
rejected because of errors in filling out cards, and witnesses testified they
were not allowed to register because they were unable to fill out registration cards correctly, there was no evidence of discrimination because of race
or color. Where there is a general policy for all, Negro and white, literate
and illiterate, in a system of voter registration, then there is no discrimination under the Federal Constitution, although there may be isolated cases
of a few who did not receive identical treatment. However, in Sellers v.
Wilson,7 it was held by the court that the failure of the members of the
County Board of Registrars to supply certain Negroes with voter's registration application blanks when they appeared before such members and applied for registration on three occasions, amounted to a denial of their requests for such blanks solely because of their race, and therefore was discriminatory. The court also said that under the Federal Constitution, no
tests not required of white applicants for registration as voters can be required of Negro applicants as prerequisite to registration.
Another glaring example of discrimination in elections has been the
efforts by political associations in the South to maintain various forms of
white primaries. Since the prohibition against discrimination in elections
contained in the Fifteenth Amendment is limited in its scope to denials or
abridgments by the "United States or by any state", repeatedly the issue
in these cases has been whether or not state action has played any part in
the elective process. At first it was decided that a state statute which barred
4 347 U. S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954).
5 224 F. 2d 608 (10th Cir. 1955).
6 128 F. Supp. 897 (W. D. La. 1955).
7

123 F. Supp. 917 (M. D. Ala. 1954).
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Negroes from voting in a party primary violated the constitutional guarantee
against state discrimination.8 For a period thereafter, the Supreme Court
permitted a resolution by the Democratic Party in convention to exclude
Negroes from its primaries, on the theory that such an action was voluntary
in character and represented a mere refusal of membership in a political
party with which the state had no concern.9 In 1944 the Supreme Colirt
specifically ruled that a state which limited the practical choice at the general election to nominees of party primaries in effect adopted and enforced
the discriminations practiced by the party, the state regulation of procedure
for the selection of party nominees making the party, in effect, an agency of
the state. 10
The Supreme Court decision in the 1953 case of Terry v. Adams," has
also frustrated for the time being the attempts of a few Southern states to
differentiate between actions of political clubs of the Democratic Party and
actions of the state. In that case the Jaybird Association, a country-wide
political organization in Texas, had conducted elections of its own, open
to all qualified white voters of the county, in order to endorse candidates
for subsequent Democratic primaries. The Jaybird candidates invariably
won the Democratic nomination, which is tantamount to election in the
county. A group of Negro voters sued for an injunction to restrain Jaybird
officials from denying them the right to vote in the Association's election,
on the ground that such discrimination was forbidden by the Fifteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the Jaybird primary was part of
the state's electoral process, and that the effect of that process as it operated in the county was- a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
In that area of discrimination which constitutes a denial of equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, several recent decisions of the Supreme Court are of interest. In a
Georgia case' 2 where a Negro defendant had been convicted of rape, the
state claimed that he had not properly challenged the composition of the
grand jury as required by statute. Under the Georgia statute such a challenge had to be made before an indictment was handed down by the grand
jury. Reece, an uneducated Negro, had no attorney until the day after the
indictment. When his attorney did make a motion to quash the indictment of the grand jury, this motion was denied by the Georgia Court as
coming too late. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that since Reece did
not have a fair chance to comply with the statute, such denial by the Georgia
Court constituted denial of due process. The Supreme Court in its decision
stressed the fact that the defendant had produced sufficient evidence of discrimination to place the burden on the state to refute it under the doctrine
of Patton v. Mississippi.13 In that case, the petitioner, a Negro, was indicts Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 47 S. Ct. 446, 71 L. Ed. 759 (1927).
9 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45, 55 S. Ct. 622, 79 L. Ed. 1292 (1935).
10 Smith v. Alwright, 321 U. S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987 (1944).
11 345 U. S. 461, 73 S. Ct. 809, 97 L. Ed. 1152 (1953).
12 Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85, 76 S. Ct. 167, 100 L. Ed. 77 (1955).
13 332 U. S. 463, 68 S. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. 76 (1947).
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ed for murder by an all-white grand jury and convicted by an all-white
petit jury, notwithstanding a timely motion to quash the indictment. Although there were 12,511 adult Negroes in the county out of a total adult
population of 34,821 and there were at least 25 Negro qualified male electors eligible for jury service, the venires for the term from which the grand
and petit juries were selected did not contain the name of a single Negro
and no Negro had served on a grand or petit criminal court jury in the
county for 30 years. The Supreme Court held that the record sustained
the petitioner's claim of a systematic, purposeful, administrative exclusion
of Negroes from jury duty contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The reasoning of the Court was that the fact that
no Negro had served on a criminal court grand or petit jury for a period
of 30 years created a strong presumption that Negroes were systematically
excluded from jury service because of race; and it became the state's duty
to justify such an exclusion as having been brought about for some reason
other than racial discrimination. The Court also pointed out that such a
presumption was not overcome by an attempt to disprove systematic racial
discrimination in the selection of jurors by percentage calculations applied
to the composition of a single venire.
In two Louisiana cases, a similar procedural point was brought up.
The issue was whether the defendants had a reasonable opportunity to challenge the make-up of the grand jury. According to the law of Louisiana,
such an objection had to be raised before the end of the third judicial day
after the end of the jury's term or before the trial, whichever was earlier.
The Supreme Court decided both cases in one opinion. 14 In contrast to its
decision in the Reece case,' 5 a divided Court upheld the conviction of one
of the parties, Michel, by allowing the State of Louisiana to successfully
maintain that a lawyer had been appointed in time; since the other party,
Poret, had fled the jurisdiction, his attack on the jury also came too late.
The dissent claimed that the defendants did not have any real opportunity
to challenge the composition of the grand jury. The fact that it was wrong
for the defendant, Poret, to flee did not mean that he had been given
due process in this regard.
In another case'" involving the question of jury selection, the names
of white persons eligible for jury service were placed on white tickets and
the names of Negroes on yellow tickets. The Supreme Court in a majority
decision sent the case back to the state court for further proceedings because the state authorities for the first time acknowledged before the Supreme Court that the defendant had been deprived of his constitutional
rights. This was made necessary by the state attorney general's acknowledgment in argument before the Supreme Court that, as a matter of substantive law, the defendant had been deprived of his constitutional rights,
14 Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 76 S. Ct. 158, 100 L. Ed. 83 (1955).

15 See note 12, supra.
16 Williams v. Georgia, 349 U. S. 375, 75 S. Ct. 814, 99 L. Ed. 1161 (1954).
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this acknowledgment being contrary to argument made on behalf of the state
before the Georgia Supreme Court.
In a Texas case,'17 the Court found that the evidence warranted the
finding that persons of Mexican descent were a separate class in the community and that they had been systematically excluded from jury service.
It was indisputably shown that the Mexicans constituted at least 14 per
cent of the population and although a considerable number of them were
eligible for jury service, not a single one had served in twenty-five years.
The Court stated that such evidence is not rebutted by the general denials
8
of discrimination by jury commissioners. Ever since Patton v. Mississippi,'
the rule has been established that where the defendant in a criminal case
makes out a prima facie case of illegal exclusion, it is the state which must
present detailed proof to the contrary.
As a result of both judicial decisions and education, much progress has
been made in this area of discrimination in jury selection. However, some
states and some officials are slower to respond than others and various
evasions through tax lists or voter's registers are still to be found.
In conclusion, the Civil Rights Act of September 9, 1957 is an attempt
by the Federal Government to infuse new blood into the old Federal Civil
Rights Act of April 20, 1871, (Title 42 U.S. Code) and to implement such
recent progressive decisions of the United States Supreme Court as those
previously mentioned. By the creation of a Civil Rights Commission, the
Federal Government has given itself a powerful new weapon to enforce Civil
Rights legislation. Under the Act the Commission has the power to carry
on investigations and subpoena witnesses in order to obtain information on
alleged denials of the right to vote and. the right to equal protection of
the laws. Upon these findings, it is to submit an interim report to the President and to the Congress with its recommendations. However, the ultimate success of the Commission in achieving the objectives for which this
Act was passed will depend upon the cooperation it will receive from state
and local officials and from private individuals upon whose information it
will be dependent.
17 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475, 74 S. Ct. 667, 98 L. Ed. 866 (1954).
18 See note 13, supra.

